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ABSTRACT 
Comparisons of national economic performance or of welfare 
provision often seek to explain these by reference to the crucial 
distinguishing structural conditions of each domestic system, 
grouping countries into relevant typologies. In this context, Greece 
often stands as something of an exception to the dominant typologies 
or is simply left out. This paper seeks to partially fill this gap, trying 
to identify a Greek model/regime by looking into the literatures on 
neo-corporatism, varieties of capitalism and welfare regimes. To do 
so, it seeks to evaluate and explain the fate of domestic reform 
initiatives. Despite the fact that successive governments have 
expressed a will to enact domestic reforms, Greece’s performance in 
adopting reforms consistent, for example, with the Lisbon Agenda 
has been notably poor. Through this discussion, the paper derives a 
general hypothesis concerning Greece’s problems of ‘reform capacity’, 
in relation to the Lisbon Agenda.  
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‘Varieties of Capitalism’ and the Greek case: explaining the 
constraints on domestic reform? 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Comparisons of national economic performance or of welfare provision often 
seek to explain these by reference to the crucial distinguishing structural 
conditions of each domestic system, grouping countries into relevant 
typologies.  Models of interest mediation; of economic system; and, of welfare 
regime have an important place in the study of comparative political economy 
and of social policy, in particular.  In this context, southern Europe and Greece, 
in particular, often stands as something of an exception to the dominant 
typologies or is simply left out (e.g. Esping Andersen, 1990; Hall and Soskice, 
2001).  Schmitter’s comment of some years ago to the effect that the southern 
European systems have been left as the ‘stepchildren’ of such comparative 
typologies still seems appropriate (1986: 3).   
The purpose of this paper is to focus on Greece and to consider the 
identification of its economy and welfare regime, in order to incorporate the 
case in the wider comparative literature. A more specific purpose is to evaluate 
the relevance of such modelling to an explanation of the fate of domestic 
reform initiatives.  To what extent do the models highlight the key conditions 
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affecting reform attempts, determining the impediments to change in sensitive 
areas such as labour market regulation; pension provision; and privatisation of 
state enterprises?  The latter are important in the context of the European 
Union’s ‘Lisbon Programme’, launched in 2000 and updated in 2005, seeking 
to achieve open, flexible markets in Europe by 2010.  Indeed, Greece’s relative 
performance in adopting reforms consistent with the Lisbon Agenda has been 
poor.  It has been one of the most notable laggards.  Yet, successive 
governments have expressed a will to enact domestic reforms consistent with 
this strategy.  Whilst such rhetoric need not be taken at face value – given the 
competing interests and preferences within a governing party - the relative 
failure to implement more substantial reform would seem to be affected, in 
part, by a government’s capability to act: the ‘reform capacity’ of Greece. 
The notion of an economic or social ‘model’ is not easily applied to Greece.  
The term is rarely used in discussions of the contemporary economy or society 
– few, if any, would claim paternity of the system.  Observers do not easily 
equate conditions with an integrated whole, a cohesive set of policy norms.  
Moreover, the system can appear both exceptional and complex: including 
relevant conditions in a coherent model with a predictive intent and 
international relevance is therefore daunting.  The purpose of modelling is to be 
selective in highlighting key conditions and gleaning the latter from the Greek 
case presents both conceptual and empirical challenges. 
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The paper searches for the Greek model within the literatures on neo-
corporatism; varieties of capitalism; and, welfare regimes.  It constitutes little 
more than a brief literature overview, offering some preliminary thoughts on 
their relevance.  It does, however, derive a general hypothesis to try to explain 
the problems of ‘reform capacity’ in Greece in relation to the Lisbon 
Programme.  As such, a pathway for future research in this area is tentatively 
sketched.  The paper draws heavily on a forthcoming book, co-authored with 
Dimitris Papadimitriou, which discusses these and other analytical frames. 
 
2. Neo-corporatism: explaining the Greek shortfall  
The complex relation between government, unions and employers in Greece 
lends itself to explanation on the basis of a ‘neo-corporatist’ approach.  This 
refers, at a minimal level, to the ability of a government to negotiate sustainable 
bargains (e.g. on wages, employment and/or social policy) with union and 
employer organisations (Schmitter and Lehmbruch, 1979; Berger, 1981; 
Goldthorpe, 1984; Alvarez et al, 1991)1.  The model posits a small number of 
organisations possessing a representational monopoly within their own area of 
interest that are then incorporated into policy-making as co-responsible partners 
(Schmitter, 1977: 9; Sargent, 1985: 232; Cawson, 1986). The ‘political 
exchange’ also depends on incentives from government and the discipline of 
unions to establish reciprocal agreements (Scharpf, 1987, 1991).    
                                                 
1 I am indebted to the review offered in Hall and Soskice (2001). 
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The approach was particularly popular in the 1970s, helping to explain the 
various forms of concertation that were then evident across west European 
states.  In more recent years, however, it has encountered a paradox: the 
existence of neo-corporatist type agreements in systems apparently lacking the 
organisational preconditions for successful concertation.  The emergence of 
various kinds of social pacts appeared related to the external discipline of EMU 
(Hancke and Rhodes, 2005).  In any event, there is the more immediate 
problem of identifying the extent to which Greece fits the neo-corporatist 
model.   
There has been a healthy debate on the nature of the Greek system in this 
respect.  In the post-war period it has usually been seen as constituting a ‘state 
corporatist’ model of some type, emphasising the reach of the state.  
Mavrogordatos (1988) outlined the history of state corporatism in Greece.  
State interference in the trade union movement began under the premiership of 
Venizelos, with a package of legislation in 1910 and subsequent political 
interventions; was greatly extended by the authoritarian Metaxas regime (1936-
41); and reinforced by the Colonels’ junta (1967-74) (Featherstone, 1987; 
Leon, 1976).  It sustained a very fragmented, highly regulated structure of trade 
unionism that can easily appear opaque to the outsider.  Collective bargaining 
has been subject to extensive state regulation, with various forms of bilateral 
(‘collective’) agreements being signed between unions and the employers on an 
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annual and, more recently, biennial basis.  Trade union density (that is, the size 
of union membership) is relatively low.  Estimates of trade union density place 
Greece alongside the UK, Germany and The Netherlands in the 20-29% range.  
Large numbers of small enterprises are largely unaffected by the collective 
agreements of the corporatist structures.   
However, Pagoulatos (2003) argues that the notion of ‘state corporatism’ 
belongs in the era of the ‘developmental state’, pre-1974; latterly, the term 
overstates the scope for state control over organised interests and of the 
possibility of state-imposed concertation.  He stresses, instead, the fragmented 
and rent-seeking character of interest mediation.  Thus, he prefers the 
identification of the system as one of a unique type of ‘parentela pluralism’ 
(2003: 162). Lavdas had earlier depicted the Greek system as one of ‘disjointed 
corporatism’ – a pithy term, but one defined rather cumbersomely as where 
there is ‘a combination of a set of corporatist organisational features and a 
prevailing political modality that lacks diffuse reciprocity and remains 
incapable of brokering social pacts’ (1997: 17).  The enclaves of sectoral 
corporatism “have been the result of mutations” of the state corporatist tradition 
(1997:17).  By contrast, Pagoulatos wishes to give more emphasis to the 
“generally pluralistic group setting” (2003: 162). 
The extent of recent change is disputable. In the 1990s, Pagoulatos argues, 
government and party intervention in trade union organisation and activity had 
been “relaxed, financial autonomy of labour unions was increased, the General 
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Confederation of Greek Workers (GSEE) acquired significant political 
autonomy, and collective bargaining was liberalised” (2003: 167).  Further, 
“consensus-oriented, neocorporatist-type procedures and institutions were 
strengthened, centralised collective bargaining and the pursuit of social pacts 
coexisting with highly decentralised company-level agreements” (2003: 167).  
This seems to exaggerate the degree of consensus and the significance of the 
pursuit of social pacts, however.  The rhetoric on the importance of social 
dialogue only emerged gradually in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Ioannou, 
2000).  Since then, it has been marked by a 'stop-go' character, discrediting it as 
a process and creating further mistrust. Moreover, the agenda of social dialogue 
has been inconsistent and fragmented, resulting in ad hoc, partial bargaining.  
Thus, Lavdas’ earlier pessimism was not fundamentally overcome.  Before 
returning to power, PASOK in 1993 had assailed the Mitsotakis Government 
for the absence of social dialogue.  In government, its strategy was attacked for 
being ad hoc and opportunistic (Ioannou, 2000).  It created several bipartite and 
tripartite bodies to facilitate dialogue (most notably, OKE: Economic and 
Social Committee / OKE: Οικονοµική και Κοινωνική Επιτροπή in 1995), but it 
then neglected and bypassed them, creating a new ‘National Social Dialogue’ 
in 1997 with a different structure and an inconsistent purpose (Featherstone and 
Tinios, 2006).    
The attempts at ‘tripartite social dialogue’ in 1997 and 2000 were widely 
regarded as failures (Zambarloukou, 2006: 220-223).  The unions had initially 
shifted ground by supporting dialogue because of the transformation of the 
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economic setting (increased unemployment, declining union density, 
privatisation, the opening to foreign competition, technological change, and the 
abolition of compulsory arbitration) (Zambarloukou, 2006).  Yet the dialogue 
broke down: Zambarloukou argues that this was due to long-term problems of a 
lack of trust and the absence of a culture to support dialogue, as well as the 
internal structural problems of the unions.    More specifically, the unions came 
to view government initiatives on pension and labour market reform as a ‘zero-
sum’ agenda, involving costly losses and few gains.   
What the neo-corporatist focus suggests for the Greek case studies - with the 
‘disjointed’ or ‘parentela’ character of interest mediation - is the structuring of 
conflict, with coordination and consensus extremely difficult to manage in a 
climate of antagonism and mistrust.  Indeed, Greece is typically depicted as 
exhibiting low ‘social capital’ (Putnam, 1993; Lyberaki and Paraskevopoulos, 
2002).  Moreover, the structure of conflict is strongly marked by the mode of 
representation within the major bodies.  Both the union (GSEE and ADEDY) 
and employers’ (SEV) federations have internal representation that is skewed 
towards certain groups, over-playing their interests.  In the union 
confederations, disproportionate strength has been enjoyed by employees of the 
public sector, affecting the stance of the leadership on key economic and social 
issues.  At the same time, the employers’ federation has displayed the 
predominance of the few very large firms (some ex-state monopolies).  This 
has favoured the distinctive interests of those who have benefited from the 
prevailing market regulations, barriers to entry, and stable product demand.  
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Moreover, the membership of Greek firms in the major employers’ 
organisations is relatively low in European terms.  The representation balance 
is tipped away from those with interests in more open, competitive private 
markets.  Interest representation tends to reflect the legacy of the risk-averse, 
statist and anti-competitive traditions of the ‘developmental state’. 
 
3. Models of capitalism: Greece as an outlier? 
Recent scholarship has shifted away from neo-corporatist frameworks to 
develop a rather more holistic approach on the nature of the domestic economy.  
Hall and Soskice (2001), in particular, broke new ground with their ‘varieties 
of capitalism’ approach and it has encouraged a burgeoning literature in 
comparative political economy.  Hall and Soskice set out to answer how 
different models of capitalism, defined by their institutional characteristics, 
shape economic performance.  In particular, “It provides a new analysis of the 
pressures governments experience as a result of globalisation and one capable 
of explaining the diversity of policy responses that follow” (Hall and Soskice, 
2001: vi).   
The basic idea is that national economies can be modelled in terms of their 
institutional frameworks and that the behaviour of these economies can be 
explained by reference to the propositions of rational interest derived from the 
models.  Whilst the perspective accounts for different kinds of actors, the 
models are strongly focussed on the behaviour of firms as “companies [are] the 
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crucial actors in a capitalist economy” (2001: 6).  They are the key agents of 
change within systems.  This represented a clear attempt to shift the focus of 
the ‘neo-corporatist’ literature beyond the stress on the state’s relationship with 
organised labour.      
With respect to types of national setting, Hall and Soskice draw a central 
distinction between liberal market economies (LMEs) and coordinated market 
economies (CMEs).  The former comprise nations such as the USA, UK, 
Australia, Canada, New Zealand and Ireland.  Here, a market-friendly economy 
structures interactions: firms coordinate with an “arm’s length exchange in a 
context of competition and formal contracting”, responding to market signals in 
the manner described by neoclassical economics (2001: 8).  The supply of 
finance and the system of industrial relations are dominated by market 
mechanisms.  By contrast, in coordinated market economies (such as Germany; 
Japan; the Netherlands; Sweden) firms rely more on non-market relationships 
to resolve their coordination problems (including finance and industrial 
relations).  Economies are structured by an embedded network of corporate 
institutions and collective organisations, which encourages collaborative 
relationships and a sensitivity to the interests and strategies of other actors.   
The general approach is not without its critics (Morgan et al, 2005).  Of more 
immediate relevance to the present study is that Hall and Soskice left explicitly 
outside either of their models France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece and Turkey 
(2001: 21).  The southern European states are seen as ‘ambiguous’ cases falling 
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between the two ideal types.   Intuitively, specialists on southern Europe were 
left uncomfortable – though to varying degrees - with an approach that: 
• Is centred on the firm and its myriad of relationships, seeing them as the 
key agents of change, contrasting with the distinct market structures and 
histories of southern Europe, and tending to downplay the centrality of 
the state in the domestic economy; 
• Neglects other forms of non-market relationships (to those found in 
coordinated market economies), such as clientelism and corruption. 
• Has difficulty in fully accounting for the distorted (or disjointed) nature 
of the parallel welfare regimes of southern Europe; and,  
• Understates the relevance of the EU dimension to domestic reform and 
development  in small, marginal economies (see Thatcher, 2004, for a 
related argument on external pressure overcoming domestic institutional 
inertia). 
It is not surprising, in this context, that France - the home of étatisme - could 
not be neatly fitted into the two models of Hall and Soskice. To underplay the 
role of the state in southern Europe is to take the ‘politics’ out of the model, 
leaving a partial and abstract notion.   
The tradition of state-driven development in southern Europe is central to 
Greece’s economic history (Diamandouros, 1994: 11, 1993; Tsoucalas, 1993: 
62).  Pagoulatos, for example, identifies Greece in the post-war period as a 
weak and incomplete ‘developmental state’, based on a ‘state-driven policy 
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pattern’ with a protected market and a deeply underdeveloped civil society 
(2003: 47). The late (or ‘late-late’) industrialisation of Greece, and its 
dependence on the Greek Diaspora and on foreign capital, meant that the state 
filled a domestic vacuum (Demertzis, 1994; Mouzelis, 1978, 1993).  The state 
exercised disproportionate influence over the economy, through extensive 
regulation, protectionist measures, transfers and subsidies.  Moreover, these 
instruments were applied in a particularistic manner, with the state subject to a 
pervasive ‘rent-seeking’ behaviour and favouring certain sectors and interests 
(Sotiropoulos, 2004).  The foreign origin and deployment of capital became 
associated with a semi-peripheral, underdeveloped form of capitalism 
(Diamandouros, 1994: 23; Giner, 1982: 176; Mouzelis 1978). Rather than 
manufacturing, these capital funds were directed by a ‘comprador’ bourgeoisie 
(serving foreign interests) towards activities such as banking, commerce and 
shipping (Mouzelis, 1978: 20 – 1).  A large agrarian and service sector, 
alongside a limited manufacturing base and an economy structured on small 
and medium-sized enterprises that were predominantly family-owned, shaped 
the economy.  Yet, whilst the state was omnipresent, it was also fundamentally 
weak (Tsoukalis, 1997).  “Its pervasive influence”, notes Tsoukalis, “is 
intimately related to a clientele system, which it has been precisely intended to 
serve” (1997: 169).  State institutions are typically denoted as weak, inflexible 
and inefficient.     
To make the approach of Hall and Soskice more relevant to Greece, therefore, 
the typology needs to be adapted.  Three alternative typologies are worth 
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examination in this regard: ‘state capitalist’; ‘mixed market economies’; and a 
more holistic representation.  
Schmidt has elaborated a ‘state capitalist’ model, with which she approximates 
France and Italy (2002).  She contrasts this model with the ‘market capitalism’ 
of the US and the UK and the ‘managed capitalism’ of Germany, the 
Netherlands and Sweden.  She outlines the ‘ideal-typical’ characteristics of 
state capitalism as follows: 
“In state capitalism, the business relationship tends to be state-organized.  Inter-firm relations 
are mediated by the state, while interaction between firms when not mediated by the state is 
generally as competitive and distant as in market capitalism [e.g. US, UK] except where there 
are ties through cross-shareholding akin to the managed capitalism model.  Industry-finance 
relations are similarly state-mediated.  Industry is more dependent on the state than the banks 
or the markets for financing and takes a more medium-term view due to the state’s greater 
focus on national politico-economic priorities than on firm value or profits per se.  Therefore, 
business-government relations tend to be state-directed, with the state influencing business 
development through planning, industrial policy, or state-owned enterprises.  It often picks 
winners and losers rather than only arbitrating among economic actors or facilitating their 
activities.  Government relations with labour also tend to be state-controlled although more 
distant than its relations with business.  Wage bargaining is largely determined by the state, 
which often imposes its decisions on fragmented unions and business, while labour-
management relations are mostly adversarial” (2002: 116). 
This ideal model is closer to the Greek reality than either of the Hall and 
Soskice categories.  Schmidt suggests that the ‘state capitalist’ countries are 
being transformed in their economic practices as a result of the retreat of the 
state and towards the lesser depiction of ‘state-enhanced’ capitalism (2002: 
141) and even more recently ‘State-influenced market economies’ (2007).  
While the Greek economy – and the role of the state within it - have undergone 
various and significant changes over the last two decades, its distinguishing 
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features remain significant.  Moreover, a challenge for any depiction of a more 
statist model than that advanced by Hall and Soskice is that the state is 
important in different systems in different ways (Hancke et al, 2007).  The 
particular structure of the Greek economy and the position of the state within it 
does indeed display some distinctive characteristics.  It is not clear that 
Schmidt’s formulations help very much in modelling the interests and 
behaviour of the state, firms and unions in Greece.  The theoretical 
interpretation of their interaction appears somewhat limited. 
 
Table 1  Southern European Capitalism: Amable (2003)  
Institutional 
area 
South European capitalism 
Product-
market 
competition 
Price- rather than quality-based competition, involvement of the State, little ‘non-
price’ coordination, moderate protection against foreign trade or investment, 
importance of small firms 
Wage–labour 
nexus 
High employment protection (large firms) but dualism: a ‘flexible’ fringe of 
employment in temporary and part-time work, possible conflicts in industrial 
relations, no active employment policy, centralization of wage bargaining 
Financial 
sector 
Low protection of external shareholders, high ownership concentration, bank-based 
corporate governance, no active market for corporate control (takeovers, mergers 
and acquisitions), low sophistication of financial markets, limited development of 
venture capital, high banking concentration 
Social 
protection 
Moderate level of social protection, expenditures structure oriented towards poverty 
alleviation and pensions, high involvement of the State 
Education Low public expenditures, low enrolment rates in tertiary education, weak higher-
education system, weak vocational training, no lifelong learning, emphasis on 
general skills 
Source: Amable, Barré, and Boyer (1997); Amable (2000). 
 
A second approach is the more holistic one of Amable (2003), who deploys 
cluster analysis (and principal components analysis) to investigate a range of 
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prevailing empirical conditions across twenty-one OECD countries.  He offers 
a typology of five ideal types:  the market-based (akin to a LME for Hall and 
Soskice); the social democratic; the continental; the Mediterranean; and, the 
Asian.  A summary of his Mediterranean type is given in Table 1.  
The portrayal of the Southern European conditions reflects a number of 
important realities.  The depiction recognises the extensive regulatory role of 
the State and it usefully broadens the picture to incorporate the institutional 
complementarities with welfare and education.  These complementarities help 
to highlight a likely pattern of interests held by actors: for example, limited 
welfare provision increases the attachment to job security.  This point is taken 
up later. 
Amable’s methodology here displays a distinctive purpose: it garners the 
quantitative data to offer a picture of the empirical reality.  Its validity depends 
on how well the data reflect that reality.  It is not an ‘ideal-type’ modelling 
strategic behaviour as such, rather it is a categorisation of prevailing conditions, 
lacking strong theoretical support (Hancke et al, 2007: 23).  Its depiction is 
close to the conditions evident in Greece, but an interpretation has to be added 
of actor interests and behaviour before explanations of outcomes may be 
developed. 
A third alternative formulation for the Mediterranean states is provided by 
Molina and Rhodes (2005).  Working within the framework of Hall and 
Soskice, they propose an additional model: that of mixed market economies 
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(MMEs). In MMEs, unions and employers have stronger organisational 
structures than in LMEs (like US, UK), but they are more fragmented and have 
more problems in articulating their interests than in coordinated market 
economies (CMEs) (like Germany, Sweden).  They have difficulty in 
delivering collective goods and in sustaining autonomous coordination in 
collective bargaining.  However, they do have the strength to veto reform: 
indeed, the political system is marked by a capability problem in responding to 
reform pressures.  Reform is arduous and depends greatly on the leadership of 
government actors in being able to overcome the coordination problems and to 
manage domestic veto points.  The creation of reform coalitions is more 
prolonged and problematic than in LMEs or CMEs.  The MMEs exhibit some 
stability: they are more than ‘a cluster of countries in transition with only 
partially-formed institutional ecologies’ (Hancke et al, 2007).  Moreover, 
MMEs are hybrid systems: southern European states have low social protection 
and high employment protection.  The depiction of MMEs appears more 
conducive to developing theoretical explanations of interests and behaviour. 
The model differs from that of Hall and Soskice who posited the 
complementarity of production and welfare regimes and see them as being 
essential for efficiency2.  By contrast, Molina and Rhodes see the hybrid of 
MMEs as potentially having greater scope for adaptation and compromise.  
Other writers have also challenged the ‘functionalist’ assumption that 
complementarities will lead to higher systemic performance (Boyer, 2005; 
                                                 
2 
 Two institutions are complementary when the existence of one increases the efficiency of the other 
(see Amable, 2003:6). 
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Crouch, 2005).  Soskice has now himself examined other types of system, as in 
Latin America, where institutional complementarities produce sub-optimal 
Pareto outcomes.   
As a model, the MME depiction supports an explanation of the problems of 
Lisbon-type reforms being enacted in Greece.  The inability to sustain social 
concertation is at the heart of the problem.  In addition, coordination problems 
and veto points abound.  The reform task is daunting: a number of important 
features are strongly embedded.  Moreover, the ‘hybrid’ character is reflected 
in skewed and limited social provision (see below) which affects the rational 
self-interest of key groups affected by economic reform.  
 
4. Distinguishing the Greek case: an empirical check  
The discussion so far has been largely concerned with conceptualisations.  It is 
now appropriate to consider those conditions that appear to reflect the essential 
Greek ‘reality’.  A brief survey of the empirical evidence is in order to indicate 
the goodness of fit with the conceptual models of the economy3. 
The problems of the Greek state, of the economy and of clientelism, noted 
above, continue today.  In international comparisons of ‘government 
effectiveness’ Greece scores relatively low in comparison to other EU states.  
Moreover, the problems of state inefficiency are evident, for example, from the 
                                                 
3
 Featherstone and Papadimitriou (2008) contains the relevant data tables. 
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fact that Greece has had a poor record in the transposition of the EU’s single 
market rules and has had a high rate of infringement cases.  And whilst it has 
been inefficient, the Greek state is not small.  Total public spending in Greece 
(as a percentage of GDP) was 49.8% in 2004, a little higher than the EU-25 
average whereas in 2006 it dropped to 46.1%, a bit lower than the EU-25 
average (Eurostat, 2006).  Of a more local character, successive governments 
have struggled to assert state authority over illegal building by ‘land-grabbers’4, 
to establish a first-ever land registry to help in this regard (a problem that also 
involves arsonists and summer forest fires), to stamp out petty corruption in 
countless everyday state transactions (in which, for example, the citizen is 
obliged to provide ‘fakelaki’ or envelopes of money to secure a public service), 
or to end the practice of party appointees even at the lowest level of the public 
sector to jobs with little function or application.  The state remains inefficient, 
obese and often corrupt. 
With respect to the economy, the key characteristics in this regard are the 
following: 
• The structure of the economy is marked by very few large enterprises 
and very many micro- and small-firms and this has multiple 
consequences for the state’s role in the economy and for interest 
mediation. 
                                                 
4 In July 2007, the Greek daily Kathimerini reported local outrage when the Finance Ministry, 
apparently bowing to pressure from illegal builders, transferred the head of the state land service in 
Aitolacarnania, in western Greece, who had sought to apply the law against land-grabbers in Mesolongi 
(Kathimerini, 24 July 2007). 
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Characterising ‘statism’ in Greece – the state’s relations with the private sector 
- must reflect this juxtaposition and the contrasting influence that follows it.  
On the one hand, there is the pre-eminence of a small number of enterprise 
networks, and especially their individual heads who possess a strong public 
profile, and have privileged access to, and influence over, the ‘party-state’, 
which in turn affects the policy, planning and allocative decisions of relevance 
to their particularistic interests.  By contrast, there is the relative political 
weakness of the vast majority of Greek enterprises vis-à-vis the state and the 
impact of the latter in terms of the regulation and availability of resources, 
though this is tempered by problems of local implementation.  
• The employment structure reflects this pattern (which is a consequence 
of Greece’s late industrialisation).  The structure is based on: 
o The importance of services, the disproportionate size of 
agriculture and the relatively low importance of industry; 
o Low rates of employment for women; low numbers of part-time 
workers; and, a very high percentage of unemployed. 
o A problem of long-term structural unemployment: with relatively 
high numbers unemployed for a prolonged period and high youth 
unemployment. 
• Union voices favour the public sector, whilst business representation is 
skewed towards the few large corporations rather than the myriad of 
very small enterprises. 
The market conditions the interests represented by the unions and business, 
advantaging public sector workers and under-representing the voice of small 
and micro-firms.  The interests of women, part-time and temporary workers – 
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and, of course, the (long-term) unemployed – have a weak union voice.  The 
profile of large manufacturing firms is much larger, but also distinct and 
unrepresentative. 
• The Greek market exhibits an ‘insularity’ - statism and protection, 
cheap labour and a problem of law compliance: 
o Labour costs, relative to hours worked, are comparatively low. 
o International comparisons of competitiveness, the extent and 
quality of state regulation, and burdens on doing business 
indicate structural disadvantages. 
o The size of the black economy (informal sector) is exceptionally 
high. 
The conditions identified by Amable (2003) are relevant here: high state 
regulation and low competition.  Whilst job protection is strong, labour is 
relatively cheap and flexibility is available via a range of mechanisms (e.g. 
compulsory overtime).  Business activity can circumvent state regulation via 
the black economy. 
• The effectiveness and efficiency of the Greek state is comparatively low, 
undermining the capability to deliver public goods: 
o The size of government administration, as a proportion of GDP, 
is relatively high in international comparisons. 
o International measures of government effectiveness show Greece 
scoring relatively low. 
The Greek case reflects a ‘statism’ but it is one of weakness, poor coordination, 
limited resources, and low skill.  Managing the state machine to enact and 
deliver reform is thus an exceptional challenge. 
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• Perceived corruption and tax evasion is very high, undermining 
competition and the effective delivery of public services and functions: 
o Greece scores poorly on comparative international indices of 
corruption; 
 Irregular payments by businesses in tax collection is 
reportedly one aspect of the problem of corruption. 
The cultural phenomenon of corruption is anti-competitive: it imposes costs 
and distorts the market, whilst offering privileged contact via enclosed 
networks.  It is evident at all levels and across sectors.  Tax evasion indicates 
the problem of the state administration maintaining an appropriate revenue 
base.   
• State spending on social protection is relatively high, but skewed, 
reflecting prevailing political interests as well as the availability of 
resources: 
o Public expenditure on social provision, as a percentage of GDP, 
has increased over the long-term and compares favourably with 
other EU states. 
o However, the coverage of state provision is relatively limited: 
that spent on families is low whilst the cost to the state of 
pensions is high. 
o Other provision is patchy: unemployment benefit is low and 
limited in scope and duration. 
This regime structures interests, as actors respond to ‘complementarities’.  The 
welfare ‘deficit’ is made up by families, where possible. It undermines job 
mobility and flexibility. The inequity in benefit entitlement creates problems of 
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social exclusion, whilst those covered by pension funds act as veto points to 
reform. 
The data shows the relevance of the literature considered here.  The highlighted 
characteristics reinforce and also deepen the depiction of Amable (2003), who 
examined cross-country data. They qualify the picture of ‘statism’ offered by 
Schmidt.  State-economy relations are differentiated by the former’s obesity 
and weakness and by the skewed structure and representation of the latter, 
affected by the mode and timing of economic development. They add empirical 
detail to the explanatory model of MMEs advanced by Molina and Rhodes that 
emphasizes the problems in delivering collective goods and signals the 
blockages to reform.  The latter appears most promising.  That said, the 
depiction of actor interests needs to take account of the distinctive economic 
structures and practices of the Greek setting.     
 
5. Welfare Regimes: Greece’s skewed and embryonic provision 
As the MME model refers to welfare politics and the economic-social policy 
linkages are recognised here as very important for the case of Greece, it is 
appropriate to turn to the comparative literature on welfare regimes.  The 
linkage between capitalist models and welfare regimes is an important one for 
political economy approaches and it has been the subject of much debate.  The 
focus of contention is whether complementarities lead to optimal outcomes or 
whether they sustain inefficiencies.  Either way, as Pierson has argued, analysts 
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need to consider how different national patterns of social policy are “embedded 
in and help to shape distinctive national ‘varieties of capitalism’” (2001: 5).  
The focus on social models, in fact, predates that on varieties of capitalism.  
Esping-Andersen’s ground-breaking analysis of ‘three worlds of welfare 
capitalism’ depicted liberal, Christian democratic, and social democratic 
welfare regimes (1990).  The extent to which this typology reflected conditions 
in southern Europe was taken up by Ferrera (1996), who argued that there was 
a distinctive type of welfare regime in the region.  With respect to specific 
pension provision, a conventional distinction is that drawn between 
‘Bismarckian’ social insurance schemes and the ‘Beveridge’ poverty-
prevention model.  The former are found in Germany, France and Italy; whilst 
the latter are found in Denmark, Sweden and the UK.  Different types of 
provision carry distinctive risks.  The ‘pay-as-you-go’ pension schemes are 
more vulnerable to demographic and political changes; the ‘funded’ insurance 
schemes are subject to capital market vicissitudes (Boersch-Supan and Miegel, 
2001).  Such features suggest that ‘policy makes process’:  the nature of 
provision affects the reform process.  Moreover, Europe’s ‘welfare states’ have 
reached different stages of development: these raise different issues for a 
reform agenda (Pierson, 2001: 431n).  The objectives of reform must thus be 
placed within the domestic context of provision: a politics of retrenchment 
(Pierson, 1998) is distinct from an agenda of varied policy objectives (Pierson, 
2001; Natali and Rhodes, 2003).  In some contexts, the agenda on pensions 
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must be directly related to wider issues of welfare, employment, education, 
taxation, and wages. 
The politics of welfare reform are complex.  Pierson (2001) has seen welfare 
system reform as being ‘path-dependent’ and his analysis places them within a 
frame of historical institutionalism (see above).  Thus, welfare institutions are 
‘sticky’, immovable objects.  The capability of government to achieve (e.g. 
pension) reform will be circumscribed by the political power of blocking 
constituencies formed by those regarded as the current ‘winners’ of the system; 
the latter will act defensively, fearful of incurring ‘losses’.  Similarly, Esping-
Andersen referred to a ‘frozen welfare landscape’.  In this view, reform 
initiatives are likely to be seen as involving ‘zero-sum’ outcomes: with clear 
winners and losers.   
The Greek ‘model’ follows that of the Mediterranean welfare state (Ferrera, 
1996)5. It is marked by a highly fragmented system of income maintenance, 
with peaks of generosity and major gaps in provision (e.g. pensions); a shift 
towards universalistic principles in healthcare (albeit with major problems of 
adaptation and funding); a low degree of state provision in social assistance 
(and a reliance on other sources of non-state support); and, the persistence of 
clientelism affecting the selective distribution of benefits and privileges.  The 
major gaps in the provision are left for other structures to fill: traditionally, the 
extended family.  From the inauguration of compulsory social insurance in 
                                                 
5 Matsaganis et al argue that it should be seen in the context of other flanking measures (Matsaganis et 
al, 2003). 
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1934, the Greek system has been anarchic, separating social need from a 
rational allocation of scarce resources and struggling to develop notions of 
solidarity and citizenship (Venieris, 1996).  Indeed, social policy has been 
subordinate to ‘social politics’.  Katrougalos and Lazaridis (2003) distinguish 
the systems of Greece and Italy from those of Spain and Portugal: the former 
are more fragmented in structure and more costly as a percentage of GDP6.  But 
alongside matters of cost are major issues of the coverage and equity of 
provision, as the later case study will examine. 
Social conditions in Greece reflect its relatively late economic development, a 
labour force more skewed towards agriculture and services, and continuing 
poverty relative to the EU averages.  Successive governments have given 
higher priority to redistributive policies at various times from the 1970s 
onwards.  In parallel there has been increased debate in Greece over the 
effectiveness, efficiency and equity of social provision, in the context of 
deepening concerns over the failings of the domestic State.  The Greek agenda 
on pension reform has not been one of simple retrenchment, but rather of 
reordering privileges and coverage alongside rationalisation.  It is a variant of 
the ‘late-comers’ agenda recognised by Pierson, where welfare provision is in 
some respects still being created.  The institutional setting is critical to the 
explanation of reform (or its failure) – composed apparently of ‘immovable 
objects’ and ‘irresistible forces’ (Pierson, 1998). Successive reform initiatives 
on pensions have faced powerful veto points, with current stakeholders 
                                                 
6 They contest, however, the notion that in general the systems of all four states are more generous than 
those found elsewhere in the EU. 
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defending entrenched and highly iniquitous privileges and other groups being 
squeezed out, whilst political leaders have also been constrained by the 
pervasiveness of clientelistic interests. 
Few would argue that the linkages between the Greek economic and welfare 
regimes produce Pareto optimal outcomes.  The welfare system is expensive, 
wasteful and socially exclusive.  There is much concern that it fails current and 
future needs.  Similarly, the economic system displays inefficiencies and 
dysfunctionalities.  It is a juxtaposition of over-regulation and a large black 
economy, of business collusion and dependence on the state, strong labour 
protection and high structural unemployment.  Finding Pareto optimality across 
these regimes for a majority seems an illusion.  
 
6. Research hypotheses for explaining policy outcomes 
Where is the hypothesis here that might help explain policy outcomes in 
Greece?  Linking the various approaches, there are several steps to take to 
derive an hypothesis of the rational actor interest.  
The labour and product markets define the economic interests of the relevant 
actors.  A ‘varieties of capitalism’ perspective – the MME model is closest -  
would focus on the rational interests of the ‘median voter’ towards policy 
reform and assume their representation through the labour mediation process.  
However, in the Greek context, the interests of voters show a marked contrast.  
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Katrougalos and Lazaridis identify Greece (and other southern EU states) as 
having a division between the protected core of the labour market and the rest, 
especially those in temporary and irregular employment, those working in the 
informal sector and the unemployed (2003: 33-34).  They term this division the 
‘Janus face’ of the southern European labour market, where one side is 
characterised by rigidity and the other by flexibility and irregularity (2003: 42).  
This is directly relevant to the discussion here.  Workers in the public sector 
enjoy high employment protection and seek to safeguard it.  In the absence of 
high unemployment benefits and a developed system of vocational training, job 
protection is cherished.  This indicates the close linkage between the labour 
market and the pensions system: heavy regulation and skewed welfare 
complement each other, as a ‘varieties of capitalism’ approach would expect.  
By contrast, workers in the private sector enjoy lower job protection, are often 
‘hidden’ in a myriad of small family businesses, operate with lower 
unionisation, and face the regulatory inefficiency of the state administration in 
enforcing legislation.  Their regulatory benefits are fewer, though their material 
rewards typically higher.  Their ‘voice’ within the major unions is weaker.  At 
the same time, the large firms leading SEV, the employers’ association, have 
shown an attachment to the anti-competitive product regulations and barriers to 
entry, with stable product demand.  By contrast, the ‘voice’ of the huge number 
of small and often micro-enterprises – a potential constituency for liberal 
market measures - is weaker.  Interest mediation is thus characterised by 
contrasting interests and strength of voice. 
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A general hypothesis can be derived (synthesising the varieties of capitalism 
and neo-corporatism approaches) to explain (Lisbon-type) policy outcomes: 
Market liberalising reforms (e.g. employment flexibility, privatisation) 
encounter a weak domestic constituency for support as the structure of interest 
mediation favours the interests of the public sector and the privileged position 
of the few large private corporations.  As a result, the key social partners 
defend the current privileges and protection, fearing the risks of more open 
competition and the consequences of low state welfare provision.  Similarly, 
pension reform will be resisted if it threatens current privileges or market 
stability, with workers anxious as to the lack of wider welfare support and 
firms as to the threat to current labour conditions. Stop-go, incremental policy 
reform is the most likely outcome across such sectors. 
The general hypothesis allows a number of assumptions to be derived, to be 
‘tested’: 
• The institutional position of the major employers is marked by problems 
of representation.  Major firms may tolerate lower efficiency in the 
deployment of labour and in the welfare regime at home in favour of the 
comparative institutional advantages that stem from the high level of 
regulation: stability and peace; barriers to market entry.   
• Domestic firms lack the will or resources to accept the challenge of 
taking over inefficient and indebted state enterprises, requiring as it 
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would the defeat of entrenched union power and a threat to the 
advantages noted above. 
• Union confederations, dominated by public sector interests, resist 
greater labour market flexibility and pension reform for fear of loss of 
privileges and low welfare protection.  They have little interest in a 
widening of employment protection (e.g. to part-time workers, 
immigrants) if it risks opening-up an agenda of reform threatening 
current job securities.  The privatisation of state enterprises will be 
similarly opposed: as a threat to current protection and privileges. 
Each of these propositions reflect the rational economic self-interests of the key 
actors and they are endogenous to the system, highlighting the impediments to 
radical policy change.   
The propositions need to be explored in detailed case studies; moreover, the 
‘static’ picture needs to take account of variation and trends.  The studies in 
Featherstone and Papadimitriou (2008) endeavour to test them in relation to the 
recent experience in Greece of reform initiatives concerned with the labour 
market; pensions; and, privatisation.  It is beyond the scope of this paper to 
delve into the empirical evidence, but brief reference can be made to the 
relevant conclusions of the case studies. 
The distinctive nature of interest mediation - ‘disjointed corporatism’, 
‘parentela’ culture - structured the voices deployed in the reform process. The 
reform initiatives on pensions and the labour market seen over the last decade 
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incurred the wrath of the major unions.  Moreover, the strongest union voices – 
GSEE, ADEDY – were deployed on behalf of the interests of public sector 
workers, protecting their pension benefits and their employment position.  The 
mode of representation was shown to be skewed to the interests of such 
workers.  The low rate of unionisation across the plethora of SMEs in Greece 
meant there was no corresponding voice from that quarter, one that would have 
had a greater affinity with the interests of liberalisation and flexibility.  The 
voice of the bodies representing SME employers – a natural constituency for 
liberalisation measures – was much weaker in the policy process (reflecting 
major distortions in the way in which these interests are articulated within their 
supposedly representative association, GSEVEE).  Government strategy has 
been shaped by this context.  
In the case of the two labour market reforms of 2005, the Karamanlis 
Government succeeded in its limited reform objectives only by crafting a 
package deal that divided the opposition and delivered some side payments to 
most players on the negotiating table. The DEKO reform was much more bold, 
however. Here the government took on and defeated the powerful unions of the 
state-controlled enterprises, even though that risked alienating some of the 
party’s own trade unionists.  The latter case is an exception from the general 
pattern of reform initiatives (although significant aspects of the DEKO reform 
are yet to be implemented). 
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The economic setting has structured actor interests.  Given the low provision of 
the Greek welfare regime – limited unemployment benefits, little support for 
mobility or retraining – it is in the interests of public sector workers, who are 
also relatively poorly paid on the whole – to act in a manner that protects their 
accumulated privileges and employment status.  The pensions and labour 
market cases bear out such interests – rational to the system – and the agendas 
of the relevant workers.  For its part, the attempts by government to broaden 
the agenda of negotiation – in the context of the social dialogue – were weak 
and inconsistent, offering limited resources for flanking measures related to 
welfare or mobility.  Trust and social capital was not developed.  The ‘game’ 
was not restructured and actor interests remained stable.  The structure of the 
economy meant that those with interests in liberalisation were too small and 
diffuse to project an effective alternative agenda.  The private sector has too 
few medium-sized players to offer a sizeable constituency and voice on behalf 
of liberalisation. The ‘system’, rather than personalities or parties, told the 
essential story of both voice and interest. 
The position of SEV, as the representative body of large firms, is intriguing in 
this context.  Structurally, it has a relatively small coverage, in EU terms, of 
firms as a proportion of the total, given the plethora of very small enterprises.  
It is dominated by a few large corporations, including some of those that have 
recently undergone a (partial) privatisation. SEV’s rhetoric has espoused a 
conventional agenda of market liberalision, but at the same time it remained 
committed to consensus-driven reforms.  The deal between SEV and GSEE 
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prior to the Giannitsis labour market reform, revealed the extent to which the 
organisation was determined to protect the stability of a dysfunctioning market 
regime.  This inevitably raised the question of whether large firms in a small 
pool had grown complacent, secure in the knowledge that the status quo offered 
barriers to new entrants, via high levels of regulation, and peace.7 Whilst 
rhetorically committed to greater labour market flexibility and the lowering of 
the cost of pension provision to the economy, SEV has been unable (whether 
through a question of will or capability) to take a leading role in shaping reform 
agendas or outcomes. In the debate over Olympic’s restructuring, its voice was 
hardly heard at all.  Hence, to a large extent, its overall attitude in the domestic 
reform game is compatible with the ‘varieties of capitalism’ assumptions 
elaborated above.  Lavdas (1997: 248) also noted that the impact of SEV on the 
politics of privatisation was ‘limited because of the emergence of considerable 
intra-business interest divisions….SEV’s role did not expand beyond a general 
advocacy for privatisation’. 
 
7. Conclusions 
The literatures reviewed here offer a distinctive and innovative guide to 
explaining the outcome of recent reform attempts in Greece.  On the whole, 
they lend themselves to modelling rational actor interests.  The ‘model’ has to 
be adapted to the distinctive conditions of Greece, but the short empirical 
                                                 
7 A notable exception from this pattern is the banking sector, which throughout the 1990s saw 
considerable domestic restructuring and major entrepreneurial initiatives to break into neighbouring 
markets in south east Europe.   
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review offered here suggested the potential of the MME depiction.  Inevitably, 
it will need further refinement.  The general hypothesis that was derived here 
for the Greek reform attempts appeared to reflect important features of the 
cases of reform considered (labour market; pensions; privatisation).  As such, it 
shows the relevance of this type of approach to the understanding of 
contemporary Greek politics.  It signals a new turn for future research. 
The ‘Europeanisation’ and ‘varieties of capitalism’ approaches are typically 
seen as opposites. They define different paths for European economic systems: 
crudely, one asserts the likelihood of increasing convergence, the other of 
sustained divergence – though both seek to allow for instances of the opposite.  
The ‘varieties of capitalism’ approach is not focussed to account for different 
kinds of external pressure influencing domestic change. Instead, ‘globalisation’ 
is seen as confirming systemic differences and accentuating divergences 
between them.  The international dimension is interpreted in terms of the 
comparative institutional advantages that remain after external pressures, more 
than as a specific causal explanation of general adaptation.  Thus, the approach 
would support hypotheses of path dependency in relation to external pressure 
and would stress the resilience of the particular market model in interpreting 
such pressures.  By contrast, ‘Europeanisation’ seeks to account for domestic 
change as a result of pressures arising from EU membership.  Here, the 
problem is to determine the relative significance of the external and the 
domestic, but also to disentangle the ‘global’ from the ‘European’.  
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The Europeanisation hypotheses potentially have general applicability, whereas 
those derived from the ‘varieties of capitalism’ more readily apply at the level 
of firms and unions in particular sectors.  There is a difference of focus here.  
‘Europeanisation’ approaches focus more directly on policy change.  Yet, the 
more the research task shifts towards explaining the lack of domestic 
adaptation to EU stimuli, the greater the need to delve into the systemic 
conditions affecting ‘reform capacity’ at the member state level and this should 
involve their micro-foundations. 
Moreover, both approaches share more ontological similarities than is often  
recognised. Neither posits deterministic outcomes. ‘Europeanisation’ 
recognises divergent outcomes to common stimuli.  ‘Varieties of capitalism’ 
has a ‘strong, non-deterministic understanding of change, given its appreciation 
that the institutions that underpin coordination are subject to constant 
renegotiation’ (Hancke et al, 2007).  Both approaches are concerned with 
tendencies or trajectories.  The clarification of independent and dependent 
variables is sometimes problematic with respect to positing a specific causality.  
Both depict system dynamics. Neither readily penetrates the internal processes 
that transmit stimuli to outcomes, in the sense of highlighting the intervening 
actors, actions and mechanisms that link them.  To overcome these limitations, 
both must borrow from other conceptual approaches and methodologies in 
order to provide greater empirical depth.   
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Further, in an important sense, the one approach compensates for the weakness 
of the other.  ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ approaches help to identify the systemic 
conditions militating against adaptation to ‘Europeanisation’ pressures.  On the 
other hand, ‘Europeanisation’ serves to highlight the precise nature of the 
external pressures an EU member state faces. Indeed, recent work has 
considered the extent to which the ‘Europeanisation’ and ‘varieties of 
capitalism’ approaches may be placed alongside each other. Menz (2005) 
suggests that the two approaches can be linked in order to explain particular 
empirical outcomes.  His study asserts that it is possible to predict ex ante the 
way in which national systems will respond after the initial domestic 
equilibrium has been challenged by EU policies. Thatcher (2007) considered 
the impact of EU regulation that followed a ‘liberal market economy’ model on 
systems that equated with ‘coordinated market economies’.  He found that 
France and Germany needed EU regulation to legitimate reform and overcome 
domestic opposition to reforms such as liberalisation and privatisation.  EU 
regulation helped national policy makers to break with previous institutional 
arrangements and to adopt sectoral arrangements very different from the 
prevailing national institutions.  He concluded that the ‘varieties of capitalism’ 
approach was weak in accounting for the impact of EU intervention, but of 
high value in understanding cross-national differences in informal institutions 
and the processes of institutional change.   
Such arguments are consistent with the thrust of the present paper and the 
discussions in Featherstone and Papadimitriou (2008).  ‘Europeanisation’ offers 
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an account of agenda-setting, of the availability (under certain conditions) of a 
legitimating discourse, and of strategic opportunities that appear beyond the 
reach of modelling capitalism.  At the same time, ‘varieties of capitalism’ helps 
to define actor rationality within the context of prevailing market conditions 
starting from the reverse vantage point to that of ‘Europeanisation’.  As such, 
the two approaches can be viewed as two sides of the same coin: each is 
concerned with that which is not covered by the other.  They are distinct rather 
than being necessarily contradictory. 
Too much scholarly attention has, perhaps, been paid to ‘Europeanisation’ 
processes in Greece.  It has become a very fashionable perspective.  In reality, 
its study frequently suggests the limitations of EU stimuli and of the strength of 
domestic impact.  On some occasions, a normative preference to find 
‘Europeanisation’ leads too readily to an assertion of its general existence 
without adequate rigour being shown in the causal explanation.  The shortfall 
may be covered by an adaptation of the ‘varieties of capitalism’ and ‘welfare 
regimes’ literature to the specifics of the Greek case in order to clarify the 
limitations, the domestic impediments to externally-induced reform.  This 
paper has attempted to sketch the basis for such a research agenda. 
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